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In June 2015, Rami was a recent university graduate in finance working in a 
bank in Damascus. While a student, he had received an exemption from military 
service. But his student days now lay behind him, the war was on, and he was due 
to report for service in September. He did not have the money to re-enroll and 
continue in school for his master’s degree. News about the possibility of getting a 
visa to Qatar came from neighbors. “I had to accept,” he explained:
I couldn’t wait. I had to leave. When I was a student, I worked in a restaurant 
one or two days a week—just to pay for things. But not even in my worst 
dreams did I imagine myself ever working in a restaurant [after finishing 
school]. I studied for years, I was one of the best in my class. And now, I’m 
not even a captain waiter. I’m a shisha boy.1
Rami’s escape from military duty in wartime Syria to Doha, Qatar, where he 
worked at a high-end “Oriental” restaurant involved the exchange of one form 
of service for another. His telling of this exchange offered the understanding that 
his labor migration was a move imposed by the war, a development that entailed 
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not only a fall in status but also an upending of who he had been and who he had 
imagined he would become.
Rami’s blunt and plaintive “I’m a shisha boy” was one of the many moments 
in my conversations with Syrian men living and working in Doha that cut through 
the ways we commonly think about the long war in Syria. The Syrian war is an 
ongoing conflict fought between the Syrian regime, the regime’s domestic and 
foreign supporters, and the many domestic and foreign forces that oppose it. It 
developed, in 2011, from discontent with the regime’s violent suppression of civil 
uprisings that formed part of the broader Arab Spring protests. Much of our un-
derstanding of the war’s impact focuses on the experiences of Syrians displaced 
by violence and the untold forms of suffering they have endured both before and 
since leaving their country for highly precarious lives and futures in places within 
and far beyond the region (see, e.g., Maadad and Rodwell 2016; Baban, Ilcan, and 
Rygiel 2017; Naguib 2017; Pearlman 2017). The group of men I interviewed in 
Doha in 2017–2018 differ from this population. They are not refugees and do not 
identify as displaced. They carry Syrian passports, make periodic visits to Syria 
to see their families, and plan to return to their home country in the future. Yet 
the war has not only compelled their labor migration or prolonged it but centrally 
organizes their lives and movements. In this essay I therefore provide a different 
and critical perspective on the conflict by examining how the war’s reach can be 
located as well amid the losses, interruptions, and experiences of those Syrians 
who have until now largely escaped its incredible violence. By looking closely at 
how the war has altered the life trajectories of and produced distinct modes of 
vulnerability for military-age men, I develop an argument about how, although 
they avoid fighting by going to work in Qatar, the lives of a group of Syrian men 
remain defined by conscription.
Through my investigation of how these men are located in a landscape of 
conscription that extends beyond the borders of Syria and into their lives as work-
ers in Qatar, I build on anthropological knowledge of how masculinity is shaped 
by and through contexts of political destabilization (Pankhurst 2008; Hafez 2012; 
Aciksoz 2017). I demonstrate how the Syrian conflict has both altered and up-
held the relationship between men and the nation-state. In fulfilling their mascu-
line role as providers for and protectors of their families, military-age men have 
avoided becoming soldiers and embarked on new migration itineraries. Yet these 
migrations, which enable men to buy themselves out of their state-prescribed mili-
tary duty as male citizens, have also led to circumscribed lives in the highly policed 
labor system of the Arab Gulf.
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In examining how forced conscription has come to define the lives of a group 
of Syrian men, I join other scholars (Allsopp 2017; Turner 2017, 2019; Suerbaum 
2018a, 2018b) committed to developing a gendered and intersectional approach 
to the study of the Syrian conflict that investigates the complexities of masculine 
identity and ascription for both those who have stayed and those who have left. 
I contribute to understandings of the socially transformative conditions of war 
(Lubkemann 2008) by tracing, across two authoritarian regimes, the trajectories 
of migration and manhood (Ghannam 2013) undertaken by a group of Syrian men 
during a time of conflict. Rather than tracing war’s destruction, I offer insights 
into its stages of remaking by showing how these men navigate a wartime land-
scape to establish livelihoods that enable them to prepare and plan for the near and 
farther-out future.
In Baathist Syria, citizenship has been measured, as Rahaf Aldoughli (2018) 
writes, “by men’s readiness to die for the nation and a commitment to a masculin-
ist conception of national membership based on militarism and chivalry.” A certain 
kind of patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988), not unlike the one Sherine Hafez 
(2012) describes being struck by both women and men in Mubarak-era Egypt, has 
characterized the nation-building and citizen-making processes of the Republic of 
Syria since it emerged as an independent state following the Second World War. In 
this bargain, the authoritative and patriarchal father, personified by the former and 
current presidents (Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, a father-and-son pair that 
have ruled since 1971), offers protection for the Syrian people as the country has 
been at war with one or more foreign enemies since the establishment of Israel in 
1948. Until a more recent neoliberal turn (Wedeen 2013), a range of welfare-state 
provisions included subsidies on commodities such as bread, rice, and sugar, as 
well as diesel and chemical fertilizer, on which especially rural Syrians depended 
(De Châtel 2014). In return, the regime demands the loyalty and public support 
of all citizens, whose efforts are in fact necessary to maintain this safety and se-
curity; citizens, for example, are expected to surveil one another and inform the 
authorities of acts of disloyalty, and men of military age are dutifully to report for 
mandatory military service.
However, as suggested by the number of men who have avoided military 
service, with estimates at tens of thousands between 2011 and 2016 (Khaddour 
2016)—including those who become refugees, hide out within Syria’s borders 
(Al-Jablawi 2019) or, like those I discuss in this essay, find jobs outside of Syria 
to work toward a payment that exempts them from duty—the current war has 
unsettled some of the terms of this patriarchal bargain. Naturally, given the risk 
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of death, being a soldier during wartime appears generally undesirable. But the 
civil dimensions of the Syrian conflict make for an important reason that so many 
Syrians would want to avoid becoming a soldier for the Assad regime, as this has 
meant not only fighting foreign enemies but also killing, brutalizing, and destroy-
ing the homes of Syrians. Being a regime soldier, in short, has meant having to 
wage war against Syrian children, women, and men. Whether or not a man politi-
cally supports the regime, awareness of this fact has served as a strong deterrent to 
doing what has been framed as one’s duty as a male citizen-soldier. 
But men risk conscription not only by the state. As men, they have been 
defined throughout the war as potential combatants both by the regime/its sup-
porters and by the myriad armed groups that have comprised its opponents (Davis, 
Taylor, and Murphy 2014). Quite simply, if you are not on one side, you have been 
construed as a member of an enemy side. Fear of conscription by one or another 
faction has therefore become a way of life for military-age men, always already 
imagined as soldiers. For the men whose stories I explore here, this situation has 
created certain vulnerabilities and disrupted their “masculine trajectories” (Ghan-
nam 2013)—the process of becoming a man across the life course—as working 
in Qatar has meant deferring future plans to labor to pay off the state for freedom 
and access to home.
I begin the essay by discussing the broader context of migrant labor in Qa-
tar and how it connects with the politics of positionality that shaped the situated 
terms of my own research with Syrian men living and working in Doha. Based 
on their experiences, I then examine how the persistent possibility of wartime 
conscription in Syria shapes the lives of Syrian men working overseas. Next, I 
show how, in avoiding becoming soldiers, these men in fact become enlisted in 
another form of service in which their lives are not really their own. I argue that, 
to provide for their families, these men cast off the patriarchal bargain of old that 
demanded the fulfillment of one’s duty as a citizen-soldier and enter into a new 
bargain with the state that requires their conscription in the global capitalist labor 
force. The patriarchal bargain is not displaced so much as its terms are altered as it 
extends out into a transnational capitalist landscape. These men offer a “different 
kind of war story” (Nordstrom 1997), one that centers not on the violence of war 
but on the gendered vulnerabilities of wartime existence and the life projects it 
shapes in relation to the negotiation of masculinities.
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WORK AND RESEARCH IN QATAR
Qatar is a small, wealthy, oil-producing Persian Gulf nation enormously rich 
in natural gas reserves, with a population of nearly three million, more than 80 
percent of whom are (primarily male) foreign resident workers from across the 
globe (Khatri 2017). In the midst of the country’s regional and global rise—from 
its expanding role in the region’s geopolitics and pursuit of a higher global profile 
in the realms of architecture, tourism, and international sporting—the population 
has increased by 40 percent since 2010, and the vast majority of people live in and 
around the capital city of Doha (Al-Monitor 2017).
Although Qatar is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country with the 
highest number of non-nationals,2 estimates from the European University Insti-
tute’s Gulf Research Centre website demonstrate the unique “migrant-majority” 
demographics of many other Gulf societies as well.3 Given this fact, anthropolog-
ical investigations undertaken in GCC countries have largely focused on non-na-
tional residents. Two groups have served as the primary locus of inquiry: Asian and 
African workers at the bottom of the labor hierarchy employed in the construc-
tion, transportation, domestic, cleaning, and sex-work trades (e.g., Nagy 1998; 
Gardner 2010; Mahdavi 2011; Gardner et al. 2013; Ahmad 2017; Gardner 2018), 
and much higher-status expatriate members of the business and professional com-
munities (e.g., Vora 2013, 2018). While these studies have enabled us to see how 
non-nationals such as members of the South Asian diaspora cut across these two 
tiers (Leonard 2003), less attention has been given to laborers working in front-of-
house jobs in hospitality, security, retail, and daycare. 
A crucial dimension to understanding life for the foreign workers in GCC 
countries is the kefala, or sponsorship, system that undergirds the labor structure 
and produces “hierarchized differences between citizens and noncitizens particu-
larly by ensuring the impermanence of the region’s noncitizens” (Ahmad 2017, 31). 
With limited paths to naturalization, this system treats all foreigners as “impos-
sible citizens” (Vora 2013), constituted as contracted, temporary resident-workers 
requiring an in-country sponsor. Sponsors hold substantial control over workers as 
the latter require their employers’ approval, for example, to change jobs and, until 
2018, to exit the country. Yet the sponsorship system is not one size fits all, and 
higher professional status, as I learned through my own experience as a visiting 
scholar at a university in Qatar, translates into more autonomy. Since 2010, after 
winning the bid to host the 2022 World Cup, Qatar’s labor laws and conditions, 
particularly those that concern the highly disenfranchised workers building the 
transportation and stadium infrastructure, have come under intensified scrutiny 
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by human rights organizations, journalists, documentary filmmakers, and academ-
ics. As a result, the government has introduced some reforms (Qatar Government 
Communication Office on Labour Reform), and in 2017, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) opened an office in Doha and entered into a three-year “tech-
nical cooperation programme to carry out extensive labour reforms focusing on 
wage levels and payment, reform of the sponsorship system, and the promotion of 
workers’ voice [sic]” (ILO n.d.). 
The lives of Syrian men in Qatar can reveal something of the heterogeneity 
of the sponsorship system and the inadequacy of describing it solely through the 
migration experiences of the “quintessential low-paid construction worker in the 
Gulf” (Vora and Koch 2015, 545). Low-paid male workers in the construction and 
cleaning industries generally live in crowded if not substandard housing conditions 
in labor camps on the peripheries of cities (Babar and Gardner 2016), are often re-
cruited and exploited by so-called middleman brokers and agencies in their home 
countries (Jureidini 2014), and regularly find employment with agencies who then 
subcontract their labor to employers for various periods of time (Gardner 2018). 
By contrast, the Syrian men I met lived in modest but adequate employ-
er-provided two-bedroom apartments—two or three per bedroom—in build-
ings in central Doha. They ranged in age between twenty-eight and forty-five and 
mostly held jobs in the food service/hospitality industry across two different, mul-
tibranch restaurant chains. They obtained their jobs through personal networks 
and, as Arabic speakers working in service, some even in high-end restaurants that 
attracted mainly non-Qatari Arab customers alongside Qatari ones, they were en-
gaged in labor much more visible and integrated into the everyday fabric of Doha 
society. At the same time, like most of the country’s lower-level migrant workers, 
they were subject to the labor structure’s restrictions—which make it difficult to 
change jobs, for example—and to many of its hardships, such as residence-work-
place transportation arrangements that could add one to two hours, often on an 
un-air-conditioned bus or van, onto a ten-to-twelve-hour workday.
Migration flows into the GCC countries are “carefully engineered” through 
state ministries’ policies (Jamal 2015). This engineering has formal and docu-
mented dimensions, such as the (pre-arrival) criminal background check and the 
(in-country) medical test required for all resident workers, as well as more in-
formal undocumented features, like the curtailing of labor migration of certain 
communities because of their perceived political associations, and the “fitting” of 
certain nationals with certain types of work (Nagy 1998, 92). For example, Afri-
can men are funneled into security jobs, Filipina women into daycare, South Asian 
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men become drivers. Syrians, like other Arabs, work in a wide range of service and 
professional-sector jobs and share linguistic—and to some extent, cultural and re-
ligious—ties with their Gulf Arab hosts. In responding to the out-migration flows 
of Syrians over the past eight years, many Gulf states claim that, although they 
offer no system of asylum for Syrians, they have relaxed their entry and residency 
laws to allow sizeable numbers (temporarily) to migrate (De Bel-Air 2015). The 
Syrian men I spoke with saw things differently, citing, for instance, the impossi-
bility of bringing their wives and children to Doha, because “they stopped giving 
family visas when the war began,” as one put it. I found in my conversations with 
Syrians in Qatar that they do not feel that they have held any special status as Syri-
ans in their migration trajectory. Recent studies corroborate this perspective, find-
ing that the Gulf countries have not been particularly receptive toward Syrian ref-
ugees (Valenta and Jakobsen 2016, 646) and that most migrants from Syria arrived 
before the war began (Valenta and Jakobsen 2017, 45). In fact, because Qatar and 
other GCC states have been allied together against the Assad regime and served 
as frontline actors during the war working to dismantle it (Lynch 2018), Syrians 
find themselves in a precarious position among the Arab worker populations: those 
who express support for or are suspected of supporting the Assad regime are con-
stituted as a security threat. 
The vulnerabilities faced by Syrian and other foreign laborers raise important 
ethical concerns about conducting ethnographic research with migrant communi-
ties in the Gulf region. While the situation is of course relative to the status and 
social capital of the person in question, formalized conversations between workers 
and researchers or journalists can put workers at risk of repercussions, from disci-
plining by their employer to loss of employment followed by deportation, and even 
to arrest. In this setting, my own positionality helps explain how, as a researcher 
from the United States, I was able to gain access to a group of Syrian migrant 
laborers in Qatar and learn about their experiences of labor and migration during 
the Syrian war.
My scholarly interests in forced conscription during the war in Syria inter-
sect with my personal life. I am married to a Syrian man, a naturalized U.S. citizen 
who emigrated in 2006 and has returned to Syria twice during wartime following 
the (not war-related) deaths of two close family members. The threat of conscrip-
tion hung less over his 2012 visit, in the early days of the war, than it did over a 
visit in 2016, but, in short, I—through and for him, his brother, his relatives, and 
neighbors—have faced this fear. Although Syrian law recognizes dual citizenship, 
“if a person’s original citizenship is Syrian, then he is fully liable to the Syrian laws” 
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(Syrian Embassy in Australia n.d.). Thus, although he is a U.S. citizen, my husband 
always has to show his Syrian national identity card when he enters Syria, and as 
a Syrian male registered in the state system, he remains eligible for conscription. 
The essentialism of his identity as a Syrian male citizen, in that it overrides his 
U.S. passport, has been reinforced at other border entries in the Arab world: in 
Lebanon (where it makes geopolitical sense due to the Syrian conflict’s entangle-
ment in matters of Lebanese society and state), but also in Morocco, where in early 
2018 a member of the Casablanca airport security forces nearly prevented us from 
boarding our flight because my husband did not display his Syrian national identity 
card along with his U.S. passport.
My analysis in this essay draws on interviews conducted in 2017–2018 in a 
mix of English and Arabic with twelve Syrian men living and working in Doha.4 
The first men I sat down to speak with formally were two of my husband’s distant 
relatives. Although, as I describe below, they had no interest in participating in my 
research themselves, they were willing to put me in contact with their coworkers. 
In a move that secured my respectability in a patriarchal field (cf. Abu-Lughod 
1988), while also offering assurance when sharing personal details with a stranger, 
I was introduced and accompanied by my husband in several of the initial meet-
ings. From these encounters, I would ask for referrals to others who might want to 
share their stories with me.
To address the question of how my positioning shaped my ethnographic 
knowledge, I would note first that I held various identities. During some conversa-
tions, I felt that I was understood as a partial insider. Being from the United States 
meant I was surely an outsider for the men I spoke with and, for some, as I discuss 
later, this proved a problem. But I was also the wife of a Syrian man whose family 
lives in Syria. This fact communicated to my interlocutors that I knew something 
about what the war means for Syrians and, quite simply, that I cared. When we 
hosted men in our apartment for meals, as a middle-aged wife and mother I easily 
took on the gendered role of attentive listener and hospitable homemaker. In the 
public, more neutral settings where I met a couple of men on my own while they 
were on breaks from work, I presented a more professional identity. This duality 
generated forms of both distance and closeness that characterized the social dy-
namics of the conversations on which my analysis is based. 
However, as Todne Thomas (2016) reminds us, the ethnographic relationship 
does not comprise just one person. Rather, this relationship is forged through a 
process of what she calls “negotiated recognition,” whereby research participants, 
too, structure their encounters with the anthropologist/researcher (Thomas 2016, 
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81). Readings of solidarity made by participants can create ties of affinity with the 
researcher. And likewise, readings of difference, though often unspoken, may be 
projected onto the relationship between researcher and researched and, I found, 
can sometimes break it off. 
Sitting down in our apartment’s living room to speak formally about the 
impact of the war with two brothers, my husband’s second cousins (mentioned 
above) with whom I had spent time casually on numerous occasions, I found their 
response stony. “Let me tell you about how the U.S. has fueled the war; you don’t 
know about this, do you?” the older of the two started out in anger when I asked 
my first question. This set the tone, and the younger brother, generally a more 
laid-back personality, followed his lead. While in our interactions until then I had 
held the position of distant affine, the way they spoke to me in the frame of the in-
terview foregrounded my identity as a U.S. citizen who implicitly supports—and 
at the same time remains ignorant of or indifferent to the effects of—U.S. foreign 
policy and its operations in Syria. The moment evoked both Carolyn Nordstrom’s 
(1997, 5) argument about the fiction of the concept of local wars and the imperial 
character of Western research (Thomas 2016). These men, and perhaps others 
with whom I spoke, saw the war that has destroyed their country as one in which 
the world, the United States, and even I were implicated. It was a moment that 
gave lie to my so-called insiderness and showed how political and historical reali-
ties configure the positioned nature of our identities and the nature of anthropo-
logical productions themselves (Narayan 1993).
All but one of the men I spoke with hail from the majority-Druze Suweida 
province whose leaders have had a variable relationship with the Assad regime 
since the start of the conflict—even openly advising its men to evade conscription 
at one point (Naylor 2015).5 This region has remained under regime control, at 
least nominally, throughout the war, and its population is often perceived as hav-
ing a pro-regime stance. Early on while living in Qatar, I learned about a Syrian 
man living in Doha who had posted pro-Assad comments on his Facebook page. 
When someone read this and reported him to the police, the man lost his job and 
was deported. To try and allay the men’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the U.S., Qatari, 
and Syrian security state apparatuses, I trod carefully in my conversations and did 
not seek to elicit their political opinions. Moreover, in my analysis, I have sought 
to avoid framings of “for” or “against” the regime. No necessary correspondence 
(Hall 1985) exists between (inherited) sectarian identity and political position. In-
deed, what the stories of these men from the majority-Druze region bring to a 
broader understanding of the Syrian conflict is the complexity of Syrians’ relation-
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ships to the regime. Amid this complexity we discover a much-needed shading of 
the war that calls into question its simplistic sectarian narratives (Phillips 2016, 
48). Important to my analysis is the fact that conscription cuts across sectarian and 
political identities and raises issues of masculinity, vulnerability, fear, and other 
personal issues that become more significant than abstract affiliations when people 
face the pragmatic dangers of war. Having described the labor context and the pol-
itics of positionality that shaped my research questions and methods, I turn now 
to consider how the Syrian conscription regime participates in the making of men.
CONSCRIPTION
In Assad-era Syria, compulsory military service has proven foundational to 
the profoundly gendered construction of the Syrian “military-nation” (Altinay 
2004) and a “totalizing project by which boys are made into men and citizen-sol-
diers forged out of the male masses” (Gill 1997, 533). Before the current civil war, 
most Syrian men did not view military service as a contentious issue; it was simply 
what every man did (Davis 2016, 51). In the stories told by my husband, his rela-
tives, and our friends, in the prewar period, military service constituted a rite of 
passage into Syrian citizenship-manhood in ways that go beyond the cultivation of 
a militarized masculinity through soldierly exercises. For instance, for most Syrian 
men going to the army meant engaging in new modes of self-care, looking after 
their clothes’ washing or their meals for the first and perhaps only—if a man re-
turns to his natal home or heads into marriage following military service—time in 
their lives. As Lesley Gill (1997) and Andrew Canessa (2012) have written about 
indigenous Bolivians, it is also through military service that the national commu-
nity itself is reimagined as men from around the country are drawn together and 
meet their co-nationalists with different accents who hail from diverse sectarian 
and ethnic backgrounds. Some Syrians learn about their Kurdish or Druze fellow 
citizens for the first time during their military service. Having had their civil-
ian national identity cards confiscated at the start of their service and replaced 
with military ones, conscripts focus their talk on tasreeh (time of discharge). It was 
at the moment of their demobilization that conscripts would both get their lives 
back, signified by the return of their civilian identities, and also begin their lives in 
the sense of planning for marriage and securing a livelihood. 
Before the war, a formalized system of exemptions spared many from mili-
tary service. Being the only son in a family qualified one for an exemption, as did 
certain medical issues. Syrians living outside the country could pay a fee in lieu of 
their service at costs that have varied in the past decade from between US$500 
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and US$15,000. In the early 2000s, in a move aimed to reduce barriers to Syrian 
expatriates and their descendants from visiting Syria, the costs of exemption be-
gan to be determined according to a complex matrix of factors having to do with 
where a man was born, at what age he left Syria, for how long he had resided 
abroad, and where he lived outside Syria (Immigration and Refugee Board of Can-
ada 2014). University students received automatic postponements that could be 
extended after graduation depending on their employment status or if they were 
working abroad. Informal pay-for-release arrangements between the high status 
and well-connected and high-ranking military officials could also reduce a man’s 
length of service, soften its experience, or even dismiss the service requirement al-
together. A Syrian man in his late forties whom I met recently in the United States 
related one example of this. Being Druze, as he told it, he was not as fortunate as 
many well-connected Alawite (the minority sect of the ruling party in Syria since 
1971) men who never serve at all, but his father paid the general in charge of his 
assigned division to allow him to do a six-month period of boot-camp training and 
then serve out his remaining time living at home working in a nearby civil service 
office. The first decade of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency also brought with it sig-
nificant reductions in the length of required military service: from thirty months 
to twenty-four months in 2005, to twenty-one months in 2008, and to eighteen 
months in 2011 (Khaddour 2016). The war has changed all of this. 
Hamid, a twenty-eight-year old restaurant employee from Lattakia, came to 
Qatar in 2008. He filed the document (sanat iqama) with the government, indicat-
ing that he could not complete his military service owing to his working abroad. 
At that time, the fee for permanent release from service, to be paid within a five-
year timeframe, was US$5,000. (I hear it is now US$8,000 for those living abroad 
no less than four years).6 He returned home for his first visit in July–August 2011, 
but, because he has not paid the fee, he cannot return again without facing imme-
diate conscription. In describing his 2011 visit, he provided a snapshot of the early 
days of a war that began as a civil uprising brutally repressed by the regime:
I went home and it was Ramadan, and at the beginning it was in Deraa, and 
we weren’t thinking that it was coming to other parts of the country. But 
while I was home there were protests near my building, outside of a mosque. 
We would watch from our apartment. And then one time it was broken up, 
there were plainclothes policemen, they had gone into the crowds, they were 
shooting up in the air, and everyone went running scared.
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Police began to do house-to-house searches looking for those involved or suspected 
of involvement with the protest movements. Hamid’s mother kept asking him 
to leave the country earlier than he had planned. Fear concerning the gravity of 
events—and, for his mother, the particular vulnerability of young men to arrest, 
torture, and disappearance—quickly set in. “She would hide my shoes,” Hamid 
told me. “If I went out and came home, I would not see my shoes by the door.” 
With this action, a quiet domestic moment inlaid with terror, his mother hoped 
to conceal his presence from the police. Even before the intensification of the con-
flict, then, before life for Syrians was torn asunder by the violent and politically 
fragmented landscape of myriad armed groups, tremendous fear ruled the every-
day (Pearlman 2016). In my conversations with Syrian men working in Doha, I 
found that state conscription practices proved central to the workings of this fear.
Throughout the war, the regime has had to rely on a dwindling number of 
soldiers. Tallies of civilian deaths due to the conflict vary significantly, but the 
United Nations estimates that more than four hundred thousand have been killed 
(Specia 2018). Although it is well known that the Syrian forces have faced heavy 
losses in the more than eight years of fighting, no figures are available for the 
number of Syrian soldier deaths. Media and policy reports are rife with accounts 
of men who have fled the country to evade conscription and soldiers who have 
defected from the army doing the same (Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht 2016), sug-
gesting a reduction of the prewar numbers of the Syrian army by as much as half 
( Khlebnikov 2018). Other men of military age have stayed in Syria but moved 
to areas outside of government control to avoid conscription. Others who live in 
areas even nominally controlled by the regime have been immobilized. My broth-
er-in-law, for example, restricted his movements to just within his village limits 
until he reached the age of forty-three (the target age for conscripts is eighteen to 
forty-two) to avoid major roads with government security checkpoints.
The old rules regarding service exemptions no longer apply. In recent years, 
as reported by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2017), the gov-
ernment has continually changed its policies regarding conscription, reserve duty, 
and postponements. The regime’s desperation for soldiers, with the war now in its 
ninth year, has meant the conscription of some members of the population who 
used to be exempt, such as university students, a family’s only son, and men over 
the age of forty-two. Amer, a thirty-year-old restaurant worker, related to me how 
before the war students could postpone military service, but now, if you are the 
eldest son, for example, and you are enrolled at a university and you have younger 
brothers, when the next brother reaches the age of eighteen, the government will 
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conscript the oldest brother—regardless of whether or not he has finished his 
studies—and allow the next-oldest brother to “take his place as a university stu-
dent.” In short, a family is allowed only one son of military age to postpone con-
scription due to his status as a university student. “Is this a straightforward matter 
of needing more soldiers?” I asked Amer. “Well, yes, of course,” he explained, “but 
it’s also to keep families from taking advantage of the system .  .  . everyone will 
want to put all their sons into university to keep them from going to the army.”
The war has also changed the length of military service from a fixed num-
ber of months to a period that could have no definite end. Soldiers serving since 
2010, known as Dowra 102 (Recruitment Class 102), have been the subject of much 
discussion among Syrians. The reality that one would have to go and fight for 
years and years, perhaps indefinitely, two men told me during one conversation, 
has served as further motivation to evade conscription through labor migration or 
other means. At the end of May 2018, the Dowra 102 were finally deactivated and 
allowed to return home.7
While officially the definition of military age remains eighteen to forty-two, 
there have been reports of men as old as fifty directed to register for reserve 
duty and boys under the age of eighteen conscripted (Danish Immigration Ser-
vice 2015; UNHCR 2017). Several presidential decrees offering amnesty for defec-
tors have been issued since the war began, declaring that those who have evaded 
conscription and fled to locations both within and outside the country will only 
be required to complete their military service but not face punishment (see, e.g., 
Al-Khalidi 2015). People do not rely on such decrees and announcements, Walid, a 
civil service employee, told me. He had moved to work in Doha after his salary no 
longer provided an adequate livelihood because of wartime inflation (Abdulrahim 
2017). “There are rules that can be in place or there is a policy issued about some-
thing, but you can’t be sure that that’s what will actually happen.” In fact, I was 
told that although the news media report policy changes concerning military ser-
vice, people hear about them, as they do about other aspects of the war, through 
Facebook or word of mouth (Dagher 2018).8
Significant insecurity exists, then, even for those men who might technically 
be exempt from service. Hamid related one such story that concerned someone 
from a village near his. He told me of a man who had been regularly filing the 
yearly document (sanat iqama) that designated his status as a worker abroad and 
was paying off the military-exemption fee within a five-year period. This man suf-
fered an accident while working in the UAE. Thinking he was safe from conscrip-
tion and unable to work, he returned home—only to be seized at the airport in 
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Damascus because his exemption document had not yet received official approval. 
He was later killed fighting. “You see,” Hamid explained, “you can send your pa-
perwork back to Syria for approval, but you cannot be sure how long that will 
take, so even if you are set up in the system to pay off your service because you 
are working outside Syria, if your paperwork has not been approved, they can still 
take you.” To avoid this stress and uncertainty, some workers in Doha bear signifi-
cant costs to travel to Oman—the nearest accessible Syrian embassy since the one 
in Qatar closed in 2011—to file their documents and wait until they are approved. 
But few can afford to do this because of travel costs and the time off from work 
it requires. As Hamid put it, “you might go to Oman and wait for weeks for the 
approval; there is no way you can know how long it will take.”
Checkpoints, where forced recruitment even for protected populations has 
been known to take place, are feared. Basel, who worked in Lebanon before com-
ing to Qatar in 2010, was the first to describe to me the udrub fiche—the comput-
erized registry that holds information about one’s military status. “I visited Syria 
without worrying for a couple of years, during the first years of the war, because 
I had done my military service in the late 1990s, but then they were running 
out of manpower, so when I went back in 2016, it was a different story.” At one 
checkpoint on the way to his hometown, Basel handed over his ID to a soldier. The 
soldier returned and said his name was flagged, that at age forty-one, he was still 
within the age limits. Basel paid a bribe—he remembered paying about US$10 or 
US$20—to be let through, and he did the same on his way out of Syria, heading to 
Lebanon for his flight. But on the return trip he paid off the solider straightaway 
before even handing him his ID, just in case someone at the checkpoint was in 
possession of the computerized database.
The violent threat of wartime conscription and its bureaucratic order mate-
rialize in the state space of the checkpoint and its instrument, the fiche. To come 
and go during the war entails confrontation with this threat. But the regime of 
forced conscription during the long war in Syria has gone beyond the bounds of 
the nation. The risk of conscription has become not just a cause for leaving Syria 
but an ongoing threat exerted across a global landscape. And, while facing this 
risk, many men labor in the Arab Gulf, trading military service for another form 
of enlistment.
MASCULINE TRAJECTORIES
In a 2018 propaganda video, “Braids of Fire” (RT News Arabic 2018), aimed at 
the young men of Syria, Asma Assad, the wife of the Syrian president, speaks to a 
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group of female army volunteers in a disparaging tone about the “so-called men” 
who have fled and hid to escape their soldierly duty. “You are the ones on the front 
lines,” she says to the women, you are “tougher [islab, literally, more steel-like] 
than they are.” In her denigration of the man who does not fight, Assad invokes 
the “logic of militarism and masculine protection” central to the construction of 
Syrian national identity (Aldoughli 2018), but she also misses the point made by 
the men I spoke with in Doha: that only by not being soldiers and leaving Syria 
for lives as laborers in the Gulf can they fulfill the role of masculine protector of 
their own families. Unlike the Palestinian men in the Israeli army whom Rhoda 
Ann Kanaaneh (2008, 83–84) describes as receiving regular paychecks and myriad 
public and educational benefits that help make them providers for their families, the 
Syrian wartime soldier, even if he is not injured or killed, cannot support his. With 
monthly compensation of about US$50 per month (Westall and Al-Khalidi 2015), 
conscription means an inability to provide.
All the men I spoke with regularly send remittances to Syria, generally via 
cash-transfer offices in Lebanon, where money can be picked up by a friend or 
relative and given to a cross-border taxi driver charged with its delivery. But the 
amount of money that goes home is reduced because of the need to save for the 
payment of the exemption fees. As Amer described, “I paid the US$8,000 already, 
I borrowed from people, so now I’m working to pay this off. I think about it, 
about how much this is, I mean . . . I could have bought a house in my village for 
this amount.” The exemption-fee structure that has allowed men to avoid military 
service during wartime is experienced as a form of extortion. And while payment 
of the fees ensures access to Syria, to home and family, the siphoning of earnings 
means the deferral of certain life-course transitions. The costs of marriage and set-
ting up a home, for instance, are instead paid out to the state. For Basel, who is in 
his early forties, the decision to stay and work as a waiter in Doha is marked by the 
delay of the experience of fatherhood. It is during his time in Qatar, after working 
in both Damascus and Lebanon as a chef, that both of his sons have been born. 
“Honestly, for me, I feel like with this money I send home to them [to my wife 
and young sons], I am just replacing myself. But my children need their father.” 
With this notion of replacing himself through remittances that both stand in for 
and also create emotional and material connectedness with his family (Ghannam 
1998), Basel spoke to the different ways in which the exemption fees constitute 
badal (substitutes), as they are referred to in Arabic: instead of getting a soldier to 
fight its war, the state receives money; instead of a father facing the mortal risk of 
fighting a war, his children have an absent one.
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With women remaining at home to do physical care work on the home front 
for children, younger siblings, and aging parents (Coe 2016), the men I met clearly 
provided care through remittances, but also other forms of nurturing. Rami, for 
example, says that through both texts and especially recorded voice messages on 
WhatsApp, his family consults him on every decision, that they “keep him con-
nected” (Ghannam 1998) and that he not only has to “pay for them,” he has to 
“think for them.” Men with younger brothers spoke of how the threat of con-
scription raises the stakes of their roles as (male) protectors by sending money for 
tuition fees to delay their military service. Mazen related how two of his brothers 
working in Doha avoided going back to Syria by finding their way to Panama and 
later Ecuador, where they could enter with still-valid Qatari residence permits. 
But once in Ecuador, the brothers kept requesting that he send money to help 
them set up a restaurant. “They are safe, they’re not in Syria, but now I’m trapped 
here working”—even after paying off his own conscription—“so that I can keep 
sending them money. I keep saying that I’ll finish my time here soon, I keep set-
ting deadlines. We all do this, we say ‘oh, when my trip home comes next year, 
then I’m not coming back.’ But we don’t know when we’ll get out.”
Economic migration has long been a feature of Syrian society, but the 
out-migration induced by the war no longer represents or constitutes, as it had, 
a pathway for upward mobility. Several of the men I spoke with, including Rami, 
with whose words I began this article, have college educations in fields like art, 
engineering, and banking. Prior to the war, they might have come to the Gulf 
to work in the fields in which they were trained. But lack of diplomatic relations 
between the Syrian regime and the Gulf states—the Syrian opposition opened its 
own embassy in Qatar in 2013—has made it increasingly difficult to obtain work 
and family visas. Many of the men I spoke to work for one of the numerous hold-
ings of a Syrian billionaire who has, because of his clout, continued to hire Syrians 
throughout the war. Thus the aspirations that transnational migration often allows 
for, that it involves an eventual move up that helps one build a better future for 
oneself and one’s kin, have been upset by the war. Other men never imagined mi-
grating for work. Though now laboring abroad as a bank employee, Walid had not 
considered leaving during the early years of the war. In Syria, he was a civil service 
employee working as an accountant with a stable salary, state-provided benefits 
(such as no-interest loans for new appliances), and long-term job security. But war-
time inflation began to push prices so high, even for basic goods, that he found it 
impossible to provide for his family. “This banana,” he gestured to the fruit assem-
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bled on the table in front of us, “you would not believe it . . . a banana became this 
very special luxury, I would bring one home to my children perhaps once a week.”
The war has upset other life-course trajectories as well. Mazen, a forty-five-
year old, had worked for the same Doha restaurant for eleven years when he and 
his brother were summarily fired for budgetary reasons in early 2018. In 2010 
he had returned to Syria to get married. After a subsequent visit in 2012, when 
he paid a bribe after his name was found in the registry of those due for military 
service, he felt the risk of returning was too great and remained in Doha. His wife 
gave him an ultimatum at one point because she was so frustrated by trying to 
build a marriage without him present; they divorced in 2015. Two years later, his 
ailing father passed away. His younger brother, who had paid off his military ex-
emption, returned for the burial, but Mazen still felt he could not take the risk. He 
missed saying goodbye to his father. Youssef, a restaurant worker who has not yet 
paid the US$8,000 exemption fee and has not returned to Syria for seven years, 
has given up on the idea that he will marry a Syrian woman. “How will I meet her 
and get to know her?” he asked rhetorically. “My brother in Saudi, he can’t return 
either, so he became engaged by Skype. Our mom had them meet, they courted by 
Skype . . . and then she came to Saudi for umrah [the “minor” pilgrimage to Mecca, 
which a Muslim can perform anytime of the year] and they got married. My mom 
came too, and I was able to meet them there.” But Qatar is not like Saudi, he ex-
plained; it is not feasible to imagine a Syrian woman getting a family visa to come 
and live with him. The challenge of imagining a life deferred—of getting married 
to and having a family with a Syrian woman—became too much:
I have a girlfriend now from Indonesia, we met online, we have been to-
gether for a couple of years. I hope that we will get married. My parents 
don’t approve, but I have to live! Life here is so hard, it’s only work. . . . After 
so many years, I needed to get a car, a girlfriend, you have to feel like you are 
living. Like you have something.
For the Syrian men I met, the war shaped masculine trajectories in various 
ways. While the role of financial provider can largely be fulfilled through transna-
tional labor migration, the insecurities of war have unsettled the path to realizing 
other socially recognized masculine roles and norms. In her research with Syrian 
men living as refugees in Egypt, Magdalena Suerbaum (2017) found that in dis-
placement, the transition into adulthood for young men proved incomplete and 
partial, and that the challenges of achieving the middle-class norms of Syrian male 
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respectability, having to do not just with providing but also with consuming (Suer-
baum 2018b, 680), have disrupted both their passages into manhood and their own 
notions of masculinity. Similarly, for Syrian men avoiding conscription in Doha, 
displacement from home has created empty spaces in their life trajectories, ones 
marked by non-participation in rituals of marriage, fatherhood, and death. Weary 
from imagining a life deferred, Youssef has begun to fill in these spaces and culti-
vate a life in which, to use his words, he has something.
While a sacrificial economy (Weiss 2014) surely characterizes the regime of 
conscription for Syrian soldiers on the front lines of the conflict who risk their 
lives for the state, a different sort of sacrifice defines the experience of avoiding 
the war through the payment of exemption fees. The risks of fighting are substi-
tuted for a life put on a long pause with no clear or self-selected end. This is a 
life of work with little autonomy and plans for a future that feels at once overdue 
but always postponed. These are, of course, the life conditions of the majority of 
Qatar’s migrant laborers in the kefala system. But Syrians labor not only under the 
threat of losing their jobs and of not being able to earn to provide but also with 
the threat of being sent back to wartime Syria. This is a specific vulnerability 
shared by military-age Syrian men across the warscape, as Suerbaum (2018a, 369) 
also relates about the fears of Syrian refugees in Egypt. Mazen, for instance, told 
me of how he and a coworker approached the restaurant management to request a 
reduction in the number of employees per room in their employer-provided hous-
ing: “We weren’t just told ‘no’; we were told, ‘go back to Syria if you don’t like it.’ 
They know we are all afraid of going back, that we have to stay outside Syria. They 
use this.” The threat of conscription organizes life for military-age Syrian men at 
home, and also for those away. The Syrian state, in this way, extends out beyond 
the boundaries of the nation. Mazen, after telling his story about talking to his 
boss, continued, “You want to know what the war means for us? That’s what you 
said you wanted to hear about, right? We curse that we are Syrian. That’s all we 
can do.”
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Hassan al-Kontar, a Syrian man in his late thirties, lived in the Kuala Lumpur 
airport for more than seven months. Deported from the UAE, where he had lived 
illegally since 2011 when his work visa expired to avoid returning to Syria, where 
he faced immediate conscription, he made the Malaysian airport his refuge after 
being turned away from a flight to Ecuador, where he had hoped to gain entry. 
From the plight of al-Kontar, widely covered in Western news media and through 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 35:2
282
social media campaigns, and his plaintive assertion that the war in Syria is “not my 
war” (Ahmed 2018), emerged a lesser-known narrative of the Syrian conflict and 
of the social impact of war more broadly: the gendered experiences of military-age 
men. During the Syrian conflict, the performance of manhood has been both dis-
located (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 2016) by, for example, the avoidance of military 
duty and refugee status under humanitarian care (Turner 2019) and, at the same 
time, sustained through the labor migrations that enable men to maintain their 
role as providers.
In my analysis of the lives and experiences of a group of Syrian men in Qa-
tar, I have shown how conscription in Syria operates as a form of debt exchange. 
Through the years-long payment of exorbitant exemption fees that diminish re-
mittances sent to families but should allow access to home, these migrant laborers 
avoid military service but remain indentured to the state. Moreover, while the 
rites of male adulthood are delayed, or displaced to younger brothers, and absence 
from kin is endured, they lead half-lived lives as contract laborers with little au-
tonomy in the Gulf’s kefala system, with the constant threat of being returned to 
Syria hanging over their heads. In this wartime economy of sacrifice, one form of 
conscription comes to be exchanged for another.
Across two authoritarian regimes during the Syrian conflict, we see how the 
state’s patriarchal bargain is not destabilized but instead reframed. The extraction 
of the military labor on which the terms of Syrian male citizenship are founded is 
converted into U.S. dollars earned by joining the global capitalist workforce. Un-
changed in this reframing is the insistence that men provide for and protect their 
families. As a consequence of how the male body is constituted as physical capital 
that must remain subordinate to both patriarchal and capitalistic demands (Ghan-
nam 2013, 170), men’s breadwinner status in the Syrian context, and more broadly 
throughout the region, produces a new set of gendered vulnerabilities. In times of 
conflict and instability, these demands send men out and away from their families 
and communities, but also dislocate them from the life course itself. In fulfilling 
their end of the bargain through political obedience and economic production, 
they miss out on a particular stage of manhood and the aspirations, projects, and 
affective promises it holds.
ABSTRACT
In this essay, I provide a different perspective on the Syrian conflict by examining 
how the war’s reach can also be located amid the losses, interruptions, and experi-
ences of those Syrians who have until now largely escaped its incredible violence. By 
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looking closely at how the war has altered the life trajectories of and produced dis-
tinct modes of vulnerability for military-age men, I develop an argument about how, 
although they avoid fighting by going to work in Qatar, the lives of a group of Syrian 
men remain defined by conscription. Through my investigation of how these men 
are located in a landscape of conscription that extends beyond the borders of Syria, 
I build on anthropological knowledge of how masculinity is shaped by and through 
contexts of political destabilization. I demonstrate how, in fulfilling their end of the 
patriarchal bargain through political obedience and economic production, these men 
lose a particular stage of manhood and the aspirations, projects, and affective prom-
ises it holds. [masculinity; conscription; war; labor; migration; Syria]
ملخص
دارسة من خالل  السوري  الصراع  حول  مختلفة  نظر  وجهة  أقدم  أنا  المقال,  هذا   في 
العنف, من  نجو  الذين  السورين  تجارب  و  االنقطاع,  و  الخسائر,  الحرب وسط   واقع 
 من خالل النظر عن كثب في كيفية الحرب التي غيرت مسارات الحياة التي انتجت
 انمطاطا مختلفة من الظعف بل النسبة للعسكرين. أنا اطور نقاش حول هوالء الشباب
 الذين تجنوبو القتال في سوريا من خالل الذهاب الى قطر. حياة هؤالء الرجال الذين
 من خالل تحقيقي في مشهد التجنيد االجباري الذي يمتد الى ماوراء حدود سوريا الى
 حياتهم كعمال في قطر. أنا أعتمدت على المعرافة االنثروبولوجية حول كيفية تشكيل
ناحيتهم من  الوفاء  كيف  أشرح  أنا  السياسي.  االستقرار  زعزعة  خالل  من   الرجولة 
بشكل خاص الرجولة  أما  االقتصادي.  االنتاج  و  السياسية  الطاعة   يتمركز من خالل 
تبقى تطلعاتها و مشاريعها و وعودها العاطفية بعيدة االنظار في ظل استمرار االزمة
السورية. ]رجولة; الخدمة اإللزامية; حرب; عمل; هجرة; سوريا[ 
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1. This is a lowly service position at restaurants involving the setup of water tobacco pipes 
and continuous checking to ensure that the hot coals that fuel them are refreshed.
2. The GCC is a political and economic coalition of six Gulf countries—Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. The coalition has been 
strained recently by rising political tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which 
resulted in an air, sea, and land embargo of Qatar, led by Saudi Arabia, and the severing 
of diplomatic relations between Qatar and several GCC countries. The rift began in June 
2017 and is ongoing at the time of this writing. 
3. See, for example, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme (2017).
4. I use a simplified system for transliterating Arabic, omitting all indication of long versus 
short vowels, as well as any distinctions between hard and soft letters. I trust that spe-
cialist readers will be able to use the context to follow my transliteration.
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5. Massacres and the kidnapping of women from Druze villages by ISIS-affiliated militias 
in July 2018 renewed this friction (Maksad 2018).
6. The workers I spoke with earned between US$750 and US$2,000 per month. 
7. Views differ about the decision to release them. Some say it was influenced by the Face-
book-generated outcry (Syria Direct 2015), whereas a pro-regime news agency cites re-
cent military gains as the cause (Aboufadel 2018). 
8. One man changed his route from Syria after learning through Facebook of the danger-
ous weather conditions along his planned route through Lebanon (Dagher 2018).
REFERENCES
Abdulrahim, Raja
2017 “War-Torn Syria’s Battered Economy Marked by Inflation and Poverty: Nation’s 
GDP Has Dropped by More Than Half This Decade; ‘A Pretty Nightmarish’ 
Situation.” Wall Street Journal, July 28. https://www.wsj.com/articles/war-torn-
syrias-battered-economy-marked-by-inflation-and-poverty-1501234205.
Aboufadel, Leith
2018 “Syrian Army Allows Soldiers Serving since 2010 to Return Home.” Al-Masdar 
News, May 26. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-allows-
soldiers-serving-since-2010-to-return-home/.
Abu-Lughod, Lila
1988 “Fieldwork of a Dutiful Daughter.” In Arab Women in the Field: Studying Your Own 
Society, edited by Soraya Altorki and Camillia Fawzi El-Solh, 139–61. Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press.
Aciksoz, Salih Can
2017 “He Is a Lynched Soldier Now: Coup, Militarism, and Masculinity in 
Turkey.” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 13, no. 1: 178–80. https://doi.
org/10.1215/15525864-3728811.
Ahmad, Attiya
2017 Everyday Conversions: Islam, Domestic Work, and South Asian Migrant Women in Kuwait. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Ahmed, Kaamil
2018 “‘It’s not my war’: The Syrian Man Who Has Spent a Month Living in Kuala 




2018 “Belonging to a Militarized Syria as a Woman.” Syria Untold, January 5. https://
syriauntold.com/2018/01/05/belonging-to-a-militarized-syria-as-a-woman/.
Al-Jablawi, Hosam
2019 “Forced Conscription Continues despite Amnesty by Syrian Government.” 












2017 “Aggressor, Victim, Soldier, Dad: Intersecting Masculinities in the European 
‘Refugee Crisis.’” In A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, edited by Jane 
MASCULINITY, MIGRATION, AND FORCED CONSCRIPTION IN THE SYRIAN WAR
285
Freedman, Zeynep Kivilcim, and Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu, 155–74. London: 
Routledge.
Altinay, Ayşe Gül
2004 The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Baban, Feyzi, Suzan Ilcan, and Kim Rygiel
2017 “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to Precarity, Differential Inclusion, and 
Negotiated Citizenship Rights.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, no. 1: 
41–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1192996.
Babar, Zahra, and Andrew Gardner
2016 “Circular Migration and the Gulf States.” In Impact of Circular Migration on Human, 
Political and Civil Rights, edited by Carlota Solé, Sonia Parella, Teresa Sordé 
Martí, and Sonja Nita, 45–62. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Canessa, Andrew
2012 Intimate Indigeneities: Race, Sex, and History in the Small Spaces of Andean Life. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Coe, Cati
2016 “Orchestrating Care in Time: Ghanaian Migrant Women, Family, and Reciprocity.” 
American Anthropologist 118, no. 1: 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.12446.
Cornwall, Andrea, and Nancy Lindisfarne
2016 “Dislocating Masculinity: Gender, Power and Anthropology.” In Dislocating 
Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies, 2nd ed., edited by Andrea Cornwall and 
Nancy Lindisfarne, 27–61. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Dagher, Sam
2018 “Assad Is Desperate for Soldiers: The Problem Is that Few Want to Fight for Him.” 
Atlantic, May 14. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/
syria-Asad-conscription-refugees-lebanon/560282/?utm_source=eb.
Danish Immigration Service
2015 Syria: Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to 
the YPG. Copenhagen: Danish Immigration Service. https://www.refworld.org/
docid/5629d2584.html.
Davis, Rochelle
2016 “Gendered Vulnerability and Forced Conscription in the War in Syria.” In The 
Long-Term Challenges of Forced Migration: Perspectives from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, 
LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers Volume 6, September 2016, 49–54.
Davis, Rochelle, Abbie Taylor, and Emma Murphy
2014 “Gender, Conscription and Protection, and the War in Syria.” Forced Migration 
Review 47: 35–38. https://www.fmreview.org/syria/davis-taylor-murphy.
De Bel-Air, Françoise
2015 “A Note on Syrian Refugees in the Gulf: Attempting to Assess Data and Policies.” 
GLMM-EN-No. 11/2015, Gulf Research Centre, European University Institute. 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/37965.
De Châtel, Francesca
2014 “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the 
Triggers of the Revolution.” Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 4: 521–35. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00263206.2013.850076.
Gardner, Andrew M.
2010 City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press.
2018 “Reflections on the Role of Law in the Gulf Migration System.” Journal of Legal 
Studies 47, supp. 1: S129–S147. https://doi.org/10.1086/693436.
Gardner, Andrew, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al-Ghanim, Kien Le Trung, and 
Laura Harkness
2013 “A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar.” Journal of Arabian 




1998 “Keeping Him Connected: Labor Migration and the Production of Locality in 
Cairo.” City and Society 10, no. 1: 65–82. https://doi.org/10.1525/city.1998.10.1.65.
2013 Live and Die Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press.
Gill, Lesley
1997 “Creating Citizens, Making Men: The Military and Masculinity in Bolivia.” Cultural 
Anthropology 12, no. 4: 527–50. https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1997.12.4.527.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme
2017 “Percentage of Nationals and Foreign Nationals in GCC Countries’ Populations 
(Latest Year Available, 2010–2016).” https://gulfmigration.org/media/graphs/
Graph1_09_05_2017.pdf.
Hafez, Sherine
2012 “No Longer a Bargain: Women, Masculinity, and the Egyptian Uprising.” American 
Ethnologist 39, no. 1: 37–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01344.x.
Hall, Stuart
1985 “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-structuralist 
Debates.” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2, no. 2: 91–114. https://doi.
org/10.1080/15295038509360070.
ILO (International Labour Organization)
n.d. “Qatar.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/qatar/
WCMS_654238/lang--en/index.htm.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
2014 “Syria: Compulsory Military Service, Including Age of Recruitment, Length of 
Service; Occasions Where Proof of Military Service Status Is Required; Whether 
the Government Can Recall Individuals Who Have Already Completed Their 
Compulsory Military Service; Penalties for Evasion (2008-July 2014).” Document 
SYR104921.E. https://www.refworld.org/docid/54042353a.html.
2017 “Syria: Changes to Legal Exemptions from Compulsory Military Service, Including 
Implementation (January–July 2017).” Document SYR105971.E. https://www.
refworld.org/docid/59d37c754.html.
Jamal, Manal A.
2015 “The ‘Tiering’ of Citizenship and Residency and the ‘Hierarchization’ of Migrant 
Communities: The United Arab Emirates in Historical Context.” International 
Migration Review 49, no. 3: 601–32. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fimre.12132.
Jureidini, Ray
2014 “Arab Gulf States: Recruitment of Asian Workers.” Technical Report, GLMM, 
Explanatory note 3/2014, European University Institute and Gulf Research 
Centre. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/32149.
Kanaaneh, Rhoda Ann
2008 Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press.
Kandiyoti, Deniz
1988 “Bargaining with Patriarchy.” Gender and Society 2, no. 3: 274–90. https://doi.org/
10.1177%2F089124388002003004.
Khaddour, Kheder
2016 “Strength in Weakness: The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience.” Carnegie 
Middle East Center website, March 14. https://carnegie-mec.org/2016/03/14/
strength-in-weakness-syrian-army-s-accidental-resilience-pub-62968.
Khatri, Shabina
2017 “Most of Qatar’s Residents Come from These Six Countries.” Doha News, February 
12. https://medium.com/dohanews/most-of-qatars-residents-come-from-these-
six-countries-17ba633ccb2f.
MASCULINITY, MIGRATION, AND FORCED CONSCRIPTION IN THE SYRIAN WAR
287
Khlebnikov, Alexey
2018 “Evolution of the Syrian Military: Main Trends and Challenges.” Russian 
International Affairs Council website, November 19. https://russiancouncil.ru/
en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/evolution-of-the-syrian-military-main-
trends-and-challenges/.
Koehler, Kevin, Dorothy Ohl, and Holger Albrecht
2016 “From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military 
Insubordination in Civil Conflict.” Comparative Politics 48, no. 4: 439–57. https://
www.jstor.org/stable/24886182.
Leonard, Karen
2003 “South Asian Workers in the Gulf: Jockeying for Places.” In Globalization under 
Construction: Governmentality, Law, and Identity, edited by Richard Warren Perry 
and Bill Maurer, 129–70. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Lubkemann, Stephen C.
2008 Culture in Chaos: An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Lynch, Marc
2018 “The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 
97: 116–26. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-08-13/
new-arab-order.
Maadad, Nina, and Grant Rodwell
2016 Schooling and Education in Lebanon: Syrian and Syrian Palestinian Refugees Inside and 
Outside the Camps. Bern: Peter Lang.
Mahdavi, Pardis
2011 Gridlock: Labor, Migration, and Human Trafficking in Dubai. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press.
Maksad, Firas
2018 “The Tragedy that Befell the Druze in Syria Is a Stark Reminder of Their Solo 




2017 “Middle East Encounters 69 Degrees North Latitude: Syrian Refugees and 
Everyday Humanitarianism in the Arctic.” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 49, no. 4: 645–60. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743817000630.
Nagy, Sharon
1998 “‘This Time I Think I’ll Try a Filipina’: Global and Local Influences on Relations 
between Foreign Household Workers and Their Employers in Doha, Qatar.” City 
and Society 10, no. 1: 83–103. https://doi.org/10.1525/city.1998.10.1.83.
Narayan, Kirin
1993 “How Native is a ‘Native’ Anthropologist?” American Anthropologist 95, no. 3: 671–
86. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1993.95.3.02a00070.
Naylor, Hugh
2015 “In a New Sign of Assad’s Troubles, Syria’s Druze Turn Away from President.” 




1997 A Different Kind of War Story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pankhurst, Donna
2008 “Post-War Backlash Violence against Women: What Can ‘Masculinity’ Explain?” 
In Gendered Peace: Women’s Struggles for Post-War Justice and Reconciliation, edited by 




2016 “Narratives of Fear in Syria.” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1: 21–37. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1537592715003205.
2017 We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria. New York: HarperCollins.
Phillips, Christopher
2016 The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East. New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press.
RT News Arabic






2018 “How Syria’s Death Toll Is Lost in the Fog of War. New York Times, April 13. https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html.
Suerbaum, Magdalena
2017 “What Does It Mean to Be Young for Syrian Men Living as Refugees in 
Cairo?” Middle East Topics and Arguments 9: 122–31. https://doi.org/10.17192/
meta.2017.9.6838.
2018a “Becoming and ‘Unbecoming’ Refugees: Making Sense of Masculinity and 
Refugeness among Syrian Refugee Men in Egypt.” Men and Masculinities 21, no. 3: 
363–82. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1097184X17748170.
2018b “Defining the Other to Masculinize Oneself: Syrian Men’s Negotiations of 
Masculinity during Displacement in Egypt.” Signs 43, no. 3: 665–86. https://doi.
org/10.1086/695303.
Syria Direct
2015 “Regime Supporters Demand End to Years-Long Mandatory Military Service.” 
Syria Direct, January 12. https://syriadirect.org/news/regime-supporters-
demand-end-to-years-long-mandatory-military-service/.
Syrian Embassy in Australia




2016 “Strangers, Friends, and Kin: Negotiated Recognition in Ethnographic 
Relationships.” Anthropology and Humanism 41, no. 1: 66–85. https://doi.
org/10.1111/anhu.12108.
Turner, Lewis
2017 “Who Will Resettle Single Syrian Men?” Forced Migration Review 54: 29–31. 
https://www.fmreview.org/resettlement/turner.
2019 “Syrian Refugee Men as Objects of Humanitarian Care.” International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 21, no. 4: 595–616. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2019.164
1127.
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)
2017 “Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of 
UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Syria: ‘Illegal Exit’ from Syria and Related Issues 
for Determining the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from 
Syria.” https://www.refworld.org/docid/58da824d4.html.
Valenta, Marko, and Jo Jakobsen
2016 “Moving to the Gulf: An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns and Drivers of 
Migration to the GCC Countries, 1960–2013.” Labor History 57, no. 5: 627–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2016.1239885.
MASCULINITY, MIGRATION, AND FORCED CONSCRIPTION IN THE SYRIAN WAR
289
2017 “Mixed Migrations to the Gulf: An Empirical Analysis of Migrations from 
Unstable and Refugee-Producing Countries to the GCC, 1960–2015.” Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 36, no. 2: 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdx002.
Vora, Neha
2013 Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
2018 Teach for Arabia: American Universities, Liberalism, and Transnational Qatar. Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Vora, Neha, and Natalie Koch
2015 “Everyday Inclusions: Rethinking Ethnocracy, Kafala, and Belonging in the 
Arabian Peninsula.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 15, no. 3: 540–52. https://
doi.org/10.1111/sena.12158.
Wedeen, Lisa
2013 “Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria.” Critical Inquiry 39, no. 4: 
841–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/671358.
Weiss, Erica
2014 Conscientious Objectors in Israel: Citizenship, Sacrifice, Trials of Fealty. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Westall, Sylvia, and Suleiman Al-Khalidi
2015 “Syria to Hike Pay of Frontline Soldiers with Bonus: PM.” Reuters, June 8. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-military/syria-to-hike-pay-of-
frontline-soldiers-with-bonus-pm-idUSKBN0OO1IR20150608.
